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A generation after the founding of the Korth Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the United States faces complex
problems in its relations with Western Europe, The early
postwar European dependence upon the united States in the
aftermath of war has not diminished although European
nations have recovered from the devastation of that great
war
.
As a result of technological developments and
political disparities, a strategic dissensus has
developed within the alliance. Apprehensive of U.o.
hegemony, European nations have sought ways to develop
their own military deterrents, i'he United States,
pursuing improved relations with the soviet Union and
seeking ways to end the "mad momentum" of arms develop-
ment, has created doubt and anxiety regarding American
commitment to Europe, The Soviet Union has contributed
to the crisis of NATO by investing heavily in a military
research and development program to achieve a rough
parity in strategic arms with the United States.
This paper sreks to discuss some of the develop-
ments since I960 that have contributed to the strategic
dissensus in the Atlantic Community. Specific issues
that will be discussed are the following!
1, the nature of bj nit tates nuclear
,. arantee to western ' > its stat is,
ana how it can ' :" ?i > y 'Git ;

2. the deterrent and defensive values of
tactical nuclear weapons;
3«. the rationale for developing independent
European nuclear deterrents and what
their contribution could be to the
future of the UATQ alliance.
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When the Kennedy Administration took office, it
found itself confronted with a strategy for general war
which emphasized a single all-out response. If nuclear
war proved inevitable, the goal was to destroy the
opposing society with virtually one blow. The single all-
out response, or "massive-retalliation", as the doctrine
was called emphasized the early use of nuclear weapons
to quickly counter any Soviet thrust across the U.S.
defense perimeter. The Radford Plan in 1957 had
introduced this strategic doctrine to KAXO } and
conventional forces in Europe were deployed as a "trip
•/ire", an impediment to ascertain Soviet intentions and
allow U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear forces time to
deploy. The doctrine would have been effective in the
event of general war, in the early 1960s, but the heavy
reliance upon nuclear weapons limited Americas options
during ^old war confrontations with the Soviet Union.
TH3 BERLIN CRISIS
The Berlin Crisis facing President Kennedy in
1961 clearly indicated the difficulties of maintaining
the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent operating
under this , doctrine. ; NATO lacked the capability to wage a
conventional war in -urope and was unprepared to
1 Henry A. Kissinger, The Tro '' Partnership,




effectively counter a major Soviet ground offensive in
Berlin, ^resident Kennedy came to realize that excessive
dependence upon nuclear weapons coupled with a lack of
political unity within NATO during moments of crisis could,
in the Soviet perception, lessen the risks of conventional
aggression m Europe «^
The Alliance was clearly divided over the Berlin
situation, f'he French resisted continuing negotiation;.;
the British were against risking war without continuing
negotiations; the Germans were divided on their positions
as their 1961 elections drew near; and the United States
pursued a build up of conventional forces in Europe
while continuing to negotiate with the Soviets over the
issue of access rights to Berlin.--3 For the Germans, the
status of Berlin was but a part of the total problem of
reunification. The Adenauer Government could not accept
recognition of the Bast German government as a guarantee
of access rights to Berlin, and American efforts to
stabilize the worsening situation threatened w'est German
hopes for national unity T
DeGaulle created an atmosphere of quiet desperation
within NATO during the Berlin crisis when he declared
Bavid I-mnnerley
,
^resid ent fre: | "'"'.,
(hew York: ot. Bartin's ^'ress, 1//2J, PP» 57-?9«
-' Theodore ^orensen, ^:_riiiii', (
Ilodder ana Stoughton, 196i>), pp. ?90-591 •
4 l-'unnerlcy, p., 62-63.

that a satisfactory solution of the German problem was
impossible and that France would maintain an attitude
of reserve and not participate in negotiations with
the Soviets. >diile recognising the soviet position on
the 0&er-Ke.isse and accepting the division of Germany, the
French sought to reassure Adenauer that they were
really greater friends of Germany and far more
miiitantly anti-communist than other allies, -ranc3<J o
unwillingness to negotiate during this crisis situation
heightened the lack of solidarity and resolve within
the alliance by causing the first split communique
(1^ to 1) in the history of IhiToJ
-ritaiu, alone of America's principal allies, -"as
reliable in her support of -American policy during the
crisis, but British reluctance to effectively demonstrate
this support by increasing force levels in Germany,
disappointed and frustrated -cierican observers., ihe
hacmilian Government considered that Britain's balance
of payment problems and domestic political considerations
made it impossible to increase British ground forces in
Central Europe.
The increasing promise of nuclear i/eapons allowed NATO
in 1956 to reduce target force levels, and the --marl car.
Badford Plan, formally proprosed in 1957, has supported
' B'unnerley, p. 62-63*
" Ibid. * p. 6J-66.
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the downgrading in importance of conventional combat and
had committed America's nuclear arsenal to reduced KATO__
force levels, Accordingly, NATO target force levels had
been reduced from ninety-six to thirty divisions, and
tactical nuclear weapons had become the primary weapons
of NATO armies. As a result, -'resident Kennedy found
that he could only threaten nuclear retaliation in
response -to possible Soviet actions over Berlin, a
threat that; he believed vain and inefficacious, -orse
i-^ive io tnestill, he felt the Soviets might perc
TiiiJ VUU\:A-iAi;lLITl FAOBLAk'
another shortcoming of the doctrine of massive
retaliation was the growing vulnerability of U.d.
strategic forces as the Soviets acquired Intercontinental
Ballistic missiles (ICBLsJ during the early 1960s. U.d.
strategic retaliatory forces at that time consisted
primarily of some 1500 intercontinental bombers concen-
trated on about 60 bases around the h world, with anticipated
Soviet missile developments, these bases and their
associated command structures would become increasingly
vulnerable to a surprise Soviet missile attack, A
n
' i'Unnerley, pp. 6m—6?.




Ch'ew i'orks Harper and rtove, lyVl),
pp. 128-129.

successful Soviet attack against American bomber bases,
soft missile sites, and control centers of the air
defense system, could have destroyed most of the United
states 1 costly strategic defensive posture before it
9
could be deployed.
In support of the doctrine of massive retaliation,
the U.S. military was operating to achieve a credible
first-strike capability. However, Soviet progress in
missile systems was threatening to undermine the
credibility of the U.S. first strike force by rendering
it increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack. Several
major changes in the U.S. strategic forces were undertaken
in 1961 to reduce their vulnerability. 3?he decision was
made to shift from the liquid—fuel, first-generation
IC3ks » Atlas and -^i tan to the solid—fuel kolaris and
kinuteman. kinuteman could be deployed underground in
silos in a high-alert status more easily than liquid-
fueled missiles, and Polaris, because of its mobility
and concealment, promised an emtremely credible second
strike capability. Procurement of 3-52 bombers was
stopped, end a program to phase out the large B-l+7
bomber force over a period of five years was undertaken,
fo decrease the vulnerability of the strategic
bomber force, the number of B-52's being maintained on
9 ^nthoven, pp. 165-168.




a constant 1 5-minute ground alert was increased from one-
third to one-half the force,- An extensive program v;as
undertaken to protect and improve command and control
centers from surprise attach, merging improved communi-
cations systems into a new National Military Command
System, rfhe emphasis in research and development
programs was shifted from maintaining a credible first-
strike capability to developing a secure "second-strike"
strategic force.- Atlas, Titan, Snark, Thor, Jupiter,
Hegulus, S-7^5 nuclear powered aircraft, -lound Dog,
Skybolt and Kike Zeus programs were cancelled during
the early 1960's as Soviet technological advances
forced this reorientation of U.S. strategic doctrine,
fhe -Berlin Crisis and the growing threat to U.S.
strategic forces caused by Soviet advances in missile
technology emphasized the need for a major reorientation
of U.o. strategic doctrine during the early 196G ! s,
Alain Anthoven and A. Wayne Smith have succinctly stated
the impact of these issues in their book, Hoy; Kuch Is
Snough?;
while the implications of the .vulnerability
problem were being assessed in DOD, the 1961
Berlin crisis took place, Whatever else this
crisis may have showed, it further convinced
the leaders of the Kennedy Administration that
strategic nuclear forces, no matter how powerful
and protected, were not by themselves an effective
deterrent to all forms o± aggression, These two
11 Snthoven, pp. 169-172.
brigadier &. ''- ;, '.. >ut ?n • ,
Institute for strategic ies, 1966^, pp.
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goals — reducing the vulnerability of our
strategic posture and increasing the capability
or our nonnuclear forces — provided the rationale
for most of the early defense decisions. 1 ^
U.S. strategic objectives were reformulated as
follows i Cl ) to deter a deliberate nuclear attach upon
the United States or its allies by maintaining at all
times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an
unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, even
after absorbing a surprise first strike; and (2) should
deterrence fail and a war occur, to limit damage to the
U.S. population and industrial capabity.. The first of
these objectives became known as "assured destruction"
and the second as "damage limiting". '3
Decisions regarding a new strategic doctrine
which would permit "controlled response" or "flexible
response" to soviet aggression were neither easily nor
quickly determined. One issue was the targeting of the
U.S. initial strike. Strategists argued whether Soviet
cities or remaining Soviet nuclear weapons should be
destroyed in the initial strike. ' in the simmer of
1962, defense Secretary ^-chamara supported a counterforce
doctrine as elaborated by his commencement speech at
the University of Michigan
s
1 o1 * ^nthovon, p. 167*
1 3 ibid., pp. 173-175.
1h Fred Charles ^kle, "Can Nuclear deterrence Last
Out The Century", \J, CliliZlI, i>1 nr. 2, •:..- 7 " 73,
p. 279.

'•The U 4 b. has come to the conclusion that
to the extent feasible, basic military
strategy in a possible general nuclear war
should do appro n coco. ia much to -: same ; av
that more conventional military operations
say, principal military obi ectivos, . .should
be the destruction of trio enemy's military
forces, not n. civilian population. 1
5
Throughout 1962, Secretary i-cbamara insisted that the
United States had the capability to destroy the entire
Soviet military target system even after absorbing a
first blov;. 16
Tr.ii CvjL'ivT—ihV .-iLu-j OF -idg^JfiiJ1 D^bfxieCTlOis
By 1963 » the deficiencies of a counterforce posture
*;ere becoming clear to -c.erican defense planners.
Secretary Scaamara stated the problem of disarming
the Soviets as folloaas:
Sully hard IGBh sites can be destroyed only
at a great cost in terms of the numbers of
offensive weapons required to dig tie:.: cut.
furthermore, in a second striae situation, we
would be attaching, for the most part, empty
c> *";i>.l .»& from which the missiles had already bean
fired. 1'he value of trying ao provide a
capability to destroy a high proportion of -ovist
hard 1GK. sites becomes even more questionaole in
viaw of the e::psctoG increase in the ^oviet




'5 Robert S. hchav.v.r: , address at the So... nc ment
-oaercises, University of hichigan, --nn Arbor, -helm gam,
June 16, 1962, Department of Uefense, Office of Public
Affairs, Kews Release no. 980-62, (June 16, 1962), p. 9»
16 ry •
(Kew fori: -•clrav;--ili, 196?
J , pp. S >-1C0.
1 7 liobert S, McUarnara, hilitnry x'r nt
Authorlgatio • " "gal^ Sgg 1 -- V. : * - -nate .'vice
dtt
.
.... on i, 1st sion, 1963 J, P« *+1 •
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The Secretary's statement reflected the growing
awareness that the Soviets were developing a secure
"second-strike" force and that a U.jj. "first-strike"
capability supporting a counterforce doctrine would be
unattainable by the midcle and late 19o0 ! s, regardless
of how much the U.S. was willing to spend in an attempt
1
3
to dO SO. U
i roblens associated v/ith missile accuracy also
reduced the value of a counterforce strategy, The Polaris
program was developed to guarantee that the United States
would have the capability to destroy "so large a percentage
of the urban population and industrial capacity of an
aggressor nation that the self-destructive of a nuclear
attack against the U.S. would be obvious to that nation". 19
counter-value weapons, lacking the accuracy needed to
destroy hardened enemy missile sites or maneuverable
ener/.y forces. Hot until 1'Jovember 1963 was authorization
given to develop a submarine launched ICEM with enhanced
capability to penetrate anti-ballistic missile (AEK)
systems that the Soviets were expected to deploy around
their major cities., in 196*+, the concept of multiple
individually targeted warheads (MIrIVs) was proposed to
18 knthoven, p. 170.
19 Karvey K. Sapolsky, .-' ;
:. J






\significantly increase the ABM penetration capability of
incoming warheads.- Combined with possible improvements
in guidance systems.- KIRVs offered the potential for
attaching soft city targets as well as hard military
targets. In January 1965 » President Johnson announced
that development of a fourth generation of Polaris
missiles had been undertaken ana the new missile, knoim
as Poseidon, would contain a more accurate guidance
system to' permit increased target flexibility.
The ninuteman system also evolved from a counter—
value weapon to a system with counterforce capabilities
as technological advances permitted greater warhead
accurace during the late 1960s.. I>aring the 1969 ABH
debate, hefense department officials announced that
hinuteman missiles could strike within one-quarter
mile of their intended target. This accuracy had
been the result of several years of developments in
warhead technology to increase missile accuracy to be
able to strike targets with smaller warhead yields and
still attain the desired overpressure to destroy the
target, decreasing the size and weight of warheads also
facilitated HlitV technology as more smaller warheads could
no
be fitted onto existing missiles.^
20
^apolsky, pp. 220-221.
21 Paul Doty, "Can Investigations Improve scientific
Advice? The Case of the ABI-I", :-ln-rva, 10,nr.2, April
1972, pp. 280-29 1+.
22
-nthoven, pp. 1 7S— 1 8M-.
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He-turning to 196lr, one finds the U.S. defence
department committed a doctrine of "assured destruction".
Before the house Appropriations Subcommittee in that year,
Secretary ^ci'-amara made the following statement:
....•-hile there are still some differences
of judgement on just how large a force should
be, there is general agreement that it should
be large enough to ensure the destruction,
singly or in combination, of the Soviet Wiion,
Communist China, end the Communist satellites
as national societies, under the worst possible
circumstances of war outbreak that had
reasonably be postulatea, and, in addition,
to destroy their warmaking capability so as
to limit, to the extent practicable, damage
to this country and to our Allies. ^3
Cost-benefit analyses were undertaken to determine
the most cost-effective ways to attain the capability to
destroy in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet
population and ?0 percent of Soviet industrial capability.
Secretary hchamara after careful study and sharp debate
persuaded Congress, the military, arid Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson that such a level of destruction would certainly
represent intolerable punishment to any industrialized
aggressor, and would serve as an effective deterrent
against the U.S. and its allies.
The second strategic objective formulated in the
early 1960s was to limit damage to the U.S. population
23 hobert S.. KcKamara, Hearings Department of
J) iferyse, Appropriations for 1965
,
house Appropriations
Subcommittee, Uioth Congress, 2nd Session, 196*+. part *0
,
pp. 27-28*
2^ tfcithoven, pp. 17^-175.
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and industrial capacity in the event deterrence failed and
a war actually occured. This was not really a new
objective , for Civil Defense programs had Ions existed
and research, development, and procurement of the Kike-
Zeus interceptor missile system had been carried oat by
the Eisenhower Administration since 1955*- ^resident
Eisenhower and Defense Secretary hc^lroy had agreed not to
commit large sums of money on this system until its
effectiveness could be demonstrated, and in 1959
-resident Eisenhower rejected an Army plan to procure
the hardware for 120 missile batteries to protect
American cities.- This recommended deployment would not
have been completed until 196d, and advances in missile
2.6technology could not clearly be projected in 1959.
The Aennedy^-lohnscn Administrations tackled the
problem of damage limitation by commencing development
of kike-X in 1961, Sprint in 1963, and Spartan in 1965.
The tecimological approach of each of these systems
developed shortcomings as improvements in U.S. missiles
were made and expected advancements in Soviet strategic
missiles were anticipated, Defense Department cost-
benefit analyses indicated that great expenses would
be encountered if the U.S. tried to provide defen.ses
against anticipated Soviet threats by the late 1960s..






the House Gor.iir.it tee' on Armed Services in 1965 :
...At each successively higher level of U.S.
expenditures, the ratio of cur costs for
i-femage Limitations to the potential aggressor's
costs for Assured destruction becomes less and
less favorable for us. indeed, at the level of
spending required to limit fatalities to about
*+0 million in a large first strike against cur
cities, we would have to spend en damage
Limiting programs about four times what the
potential agressor would have to spend on
damage creating forces, i.e. "his" assured
destruction forces.
This argument is not conclusive against
our -undertaking a major new damage Limiting
program,. The resources available to the
Soviets ore more limited than our own and
they, may not actually react to our initiatives
as we have assumed, But it does underscore
the fact that beyond a certain level of
defense, the cost advantage lies increasingly
with the offense, and this fact must be taken
into account in any decision to commit our-
selves to large outlays for additional
defensive measures. r-°
In September 1967, Secretary hcKamara strongly
recommended against the deployment of an ABM system to
shield against a Soviet attack, stating that such a
shield would induce the Soviets to vastly increase
their offensive forces, contributing to the "mad
momentum" in nuclear weapons development:
-very * :.^- system that is no;; feasible
involves firing defensive missiles at
incoming offensive warheads in an effort
2° kobert s. KcNamara, "General Nuclear ••• r:
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to destroy thou.. But what many commentators
on this issue overlook is that any such system
can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy
simply sending more offensive v:arheads, or
dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles
capable of disposing of the:;..
And this is the whole crux of the nuclear
action-reaction phenomenon.
•/ere we zo deploy a heavy Ai&l system
throughout the United States, the Soviets
would clearly be strongly motivated to so
increase their offensive capability as to
cancel out our defensive advantage,
it is futile for each of us to spend sM
billion, v L:-G billion, or v4C0 billion -- and
at the end of all the spending, and at the
end of ail the deployment, and at the end
of all the effort, to be relatively at the
same point of balance on the security .scale
that we are now.
if we in turn hope for heavy iufti deploy-
ment — at whatever price — we can be
certain that the Soviets will react to offset
the advantage we would hope to gain.
....-here is no point whatever in our
responding by going to a massive -—h deploy-
ment to protect our population, when such a
system would be ineffective against a
CpU iJii-Li> L. _H_iti U~U '-'U V j_0 ^ UliCJJDCi
In the speech just cited, the Secretary summarized
the Johnson administration's goals for a strategic
deterrent, stating that the United states' greatest
deterrent against a Soviet strike was not a massive,
costly, but highly penetrable ABi-i shield, but rather
a fully credible offensive assured destruction capability,
Secretary hchamara indicated that the U.S. must further
expand sophisticated offensive forces to preserve fch
United States' overwhelming as.-..' I destruction
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capability if the Soviets elected to deploy a heavy
. 2d
. J O- <> Ci-U i
jLJ.L±JaiJ iiDi-i UjJVjjjCr-'Kli'IT
The Johnson Administration realised the potential
cf a Chinese nuclear strategic force and undertook
development of a Chinese-oriented ABK system in 1967«.
This system was named Safeguard and was intended to
provide a light and reliable ABK shield against the
degree of sophistication Chinese ICIh programs were
expected to demonstrate by the mid 1970s,
Secretary hchamara outlined the advantages of
such an ABI-i deployment in his September 1967 speech
to editors of United Press International!
i-oreover, such an ABi-i deployment designed
against a possible Chinese attach would have a
number of other advantages, -t would provide an
additional indication to Asians that we intend
to deter China from nuclear blackmail, and thus
would contribute toward our goal of discouraging
nuclear weapon proliferation among the present
non-nuclear countries.
Further, the Chinese-oriented ABK deploy-
ment would enable us to add — as a concurrent
benefit — a further defense of our hinuteman
sites against soviet attach, which means that
at modest cost we would in fact be adding
even greater effectiveness to our offensive
missile force and avoiding a much more costly
expansion of tiiat force.
finally, such a reasonably reliable
system would add protection of our population
against the improbable but possible accidental
launch of an intercontinental missile by any
ofthe nu c1ear owe r s
«
136.
23 hcKamara, "A Limited A ' .loym it", p, 13 ! <~
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After a detailed review of all these con-
siderations, we have decided to go forward with
this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, and we
will begin actual production of such a system
at the end of this year, '
In addition President Johnson strongly felt that
the U.S. must develop ABM expertise to maintain a
psychological equilibrium if meaningful strategic arms
.
limitation negotiations were to be undertaken with the
Soviets and ordered the Safeguard program continued.
In 1969, the Nixon Administration and Congress reviewed
the Safeguard ABM development program. After intense
debate, the program was continued on a limited scale.
^
Subsequently, agreement has been reached with the Soviet
Union to limit ABM development and deployment. 31
Ihe decision not to pursue "damage limiting"
programs in the form of ABM systems evolved during the
last decade in an atmosphere of intense study and debate.
Very likely, the last chapter of ABM development has not
yet been written. For instance, the Nixon Administration's
Fiscal Year 7o budget proposals contain requests for funds
to develop maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MARVs.) to
permit U.S. ICBMs to evade possible future Soviet
defenses and to continue development surveillance systems
29 McKamara, "A Limited ABM Deployment", p.- 136.
30 Doty, pp. 280-29^
.
31 Henry Brandon, i'ho ,^ebre:\t of American Pov^r,
(New York: Doubleday, 1973 > , p. 21^..
1.8

to detect ICB1-; end SLBh launchings against the U.o,.32
In summary, U.S. strategic doctrine, as it has
developed from I960 has been built upon the foundation
of e powerful, well-hedged "assured-destruction"
capability -- an evolution from the notion of "massive
retaliation" to a deterrence based on "assured destruction'
and "damage limitation" , and finally to deterrence based
on "assured destruction" only, -he U.S. strategic forces
are designed to destroy one-fifth to one-fourth of the
Soviet population and one-half of the Soviet industrial
capacity, even after absorbing a full-scale surprise
n + * n <-«V
KATO — A STRATEGIC DISSiiNSUS
Fred Charles Ikle, maintains that the evolution
from "massive retaliation" to "assured destruction" has
developed a contradiction between U.S. national strategic
objectives and the deployment of U.o. nuclear forces
within the KATO alliance. U.S. S.hu nuclear forces
continue to operate in accordance with a counterforce,
disarming doctrine as a response to a major attach in
Europe, while U.S. global deterrence posture meets the
o osite requirement -- "assured destruction", a
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r, f a - »O w Jcapability. 33 According to Ikle the United St;
decision not to pursue programs of damage limitation
cou'oled with the doctrine of "assured destruction"
*. u
within the KATG alliance.
L_
~* V —\-*i + --"'. "] *- r^ r" ~r» *~i "T*"f ^ ^ir'.pT*'' Kqp f ni e ,-" -* 'rtQvi/inn
»MJ L/C j. o -xci_LO.o£) ± cix x UcouX-LuCo Uiiib U_L.ooe. i .._)Uo
within NATO, resulting from the advent of the IGBi-i
as follows!
Until 1357, when the Soviet Union
launched its first sputnik and thus
provided vivid evidence of its capacity
to inflict nuclear destruction upon the
United states, the U.S. military guarantee
appeared to provide adequate protection to
western Europe. I1he advent of the inter-
continental ballistic missile drastically
altered the ~ast--<est strategic confronta-
tion, European confidence in the Willingness,
of the United States to employ nuclear
weapons to defend Western Europe waned once
the United States itself became vulnerable to
attach by intercontinental missiles, in
«urope the question was raise! v.rhether the
United States would risk its own destruction
in or:: or to defend Western -urope. -he very
utility of alliance systems was cast into
doubt, since alliance^ membership night
commit a nation, to an extent unprecedented,
to the defense of int rests which dould not be
safe uarded L'ithout the risk of national
destruction. ~> *'
western European nations have voiced considerable
doubt concerning the United States' ability and willing-
ness to corar.it nuclear weapons to the defense of •estean
Surope. Following are criticisms .:h'ch can be describ
,
33 hide, pa. 277-279.
"-'
I 'fj Robert L. Jr.,
'
Jhe fc Ls_°J i ritv :
a Cpmp] x; lrnbali ., tl'iew -ork: Van Kostrand, 1969 J, p. ; •
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in part at least, by the "contradiction" analys:
by Ikies
1. The United States is unwilling to permit
the use of either strategic or tactical nuclear
weapons in the -urepean theater bee-use of the
risk o£ escalation to strategic attack upon
American cities. Supporting arguments generally
include the increased emphasis American adminis-
trations have placed on conventional rather than
nuclear weapons, the continuing pressure upon
Europeans to increase force levels, the intro-
duction of the "pause" concept envisioned by
the doctrine of "flexible response", end the
attention devoted to a highly centralised command
and control system over nuclear weapons, virtually
removing nuclear decision-making authority from
local commanders. J '
2. fhe United States has consistently opposed
the development of independent nuclear forces with-
in the NATO alliance. This attitude on the part
of Americans has led Europeans, especially the
French, to believe that the U.S. nuclear commit-
ment has been lessened by Soviet missile develop-
ments and that nuclear proliferation increases
the chances that American cities would bo destroyed
3? Pfaltzgraff, p. 3^.
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in the event of war in Europe.. Arguments supporting
this belief frequently refer to the criticisms
regarding European nuclear forces made by the
U.S. Defense Department during the tenure of
Secretary Robert ncKamara.. Also, the concept of
the hL? is often cited as a "near disaster" in
alliance planning, a complicated American
proposal to permit mixed manning of naval vessels,
permitting NATO governments to have a voice in
the decision to use nuclear weapons. However,
each nation had the authority to e:-;ercise a veto,
so the use of nuclear weapons could still bo
controlled by the U.o,,-'
j 3, U.S. plans to counter Soviet aggression in
Europe are centered around the expectation that
the -arsaw ract would initially strike with
conventional weapons, The U.S. has maintained
this view despite indications that the Soviets
would use nuclear weapons at an early stage of
conflict. •>'
h. In the event of war in Europe, the U.S.
would attempt to limit war to the continent and
36 Bernard Brodie, "Kow hot to Lead an Alliance",
American Defense Policy , 2nd edition, ed. i-ark &, Smith
and Claude J, Johns, Jr.. (Baltimore, Md..: John I Ins
xress, 1968), pp. 197-201.
37 rfaltzgraff, p. 3 ] ^
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might even be willing to sacrifice West European
territory for the sake of avoiding a nuclear
exchange with the soviet Union., This criticism
is supported by U.S. emphasis upon maintaining
higher levels of conventionally equipped forces
than required by the doctrine of ."massive
retaliation". These forces would fight a
defensive war on the continent, turning -urope
into a major battlefield to spare American
cities from obstruction. 3°
These criticisms reflect the concern that Europeans
have voiced as they have come to perceive the lessening
of America's nuclear guarantee. America's willingness
to commit nuclear weapons is less than automatic, and this
degree of uncertainty has contributed to a strategic
dissensus within KATO»
Bernard Bpodie has summarized the strategic dissensus
as follows:
...no one wants to see any kind of serious
war breaking out in Europe, whether nuclear
or non-nuclear*, tut the Europeans would
rather see war avoided by the threat of using
nuclear weapons than take the risk which
might stem from letting that threat become
ambiguous, 'They also want to avoid the great
added costs of the proposed conventional
buildup for a war they consider almost impossible,
Washington, on the other hand, has cont.iii.uod to
insist that we must think not only about
deterring war but about hoe ping it non-nuclear
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The threat of using nuclear weapons has become
ambiguous.- By design, the U.S. has cade the threat
ambiguous, America maintains a "triad' 1 of nuclear
delivery systems to maximize difficulty for Soviet
defer.se planning, kore important:, by not stating
precise circumstances under which the U.S. would resort
to using nuclear weapons, U.S. Defense officials feel
that the Soviets would be forced to face greater risks
and uncertainties when trying to anticipate America's
reaction to military moves they may be considering.
jinthoven and Smith, when discussing the role of nuclear
weapons in their book, Hpw_l-uch Is enough, stated the
following:
To point out the limited role of U.S.
strategic nuclear forces is not to say
that they did not have an important relation-
ship to NATO* They obviously did. in view
of our U.S. visible political and military
commitment to NATO, the Soviets could never
be sure that the United states would not
use strategic nuclear forces in the event
of an attach on Europe, even at the risk
of a Soviet attack on the United States.
In this sense, nuclear weapons were obviously
important in helping to deter aggression —
even .' ;r ssion limited to the European
theater. IU
These authors were writing of defense decisions
39 Brodie, p. 201.
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^nthoven, pp. 123-1! ' •
2h

made during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, but
the Nixon Administration has continued and expanded a
policy of ambiguity regarding nuclear weapons in support
Li.
of the Nixon Doctrine. ' President Nixon has argued for
the flexibility of carrying out a limited nuclear
response to provide alternatives appropriate to the
nature and level of the provocation. In his 1971
foreign Policy Message, President Nixon reiterated his
view of the importance of this option. "I must not
be -•= and my successors must not be — limited to the
indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians
as the sole possible response to challenges. This is
especially so 'when that response involves the likelihood
of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population."
The President concluded that "we must insure that we
have the forces and procedures that provide us with
alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the
provocation. "^2
--resident Nixon and Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger have sought to develop an option of limited
response against the possibility of limited attack.
Technological advancements in Soviet missile systems
*• President Nixon's address, "•- 'inition of
the United States ^oie in the «'orld", U»S. Foreign
Policy 1971
,
(Dept, of "State Publication, i-nrch, 1972),
PP. ^+21-^29.
^Charles N. Schultze, -.. n •:•' I, I L'ie I, Lice 1-*.
"ivlin, Nancy H, Teeters, ' LfLiisJ 3 J.





could give then the capability to attack with part of
their missile force, destroying some U.o. strategic
forces, holding in reserve a substantial follow-on
nuclear attack capability to threaten U.S. cities, if
the Soviets actually attacked U.S. strategic forces,
then the U.S.
y
operating under the doctrine of "assured
destruction", would have the option of attacking Soviet
cities and receiving attacks upon U.S. cities in
retaliation, or of resorting to action below the threshold
of nuclear weapons. The Kixon Administration does not
desire U.S. nuclear forces to become impotent in such
a scenario. ~>
i'he Soviet Union is allowed to pursue qualitative
improvements in nuclear strategic systems in accordance
T.r-i 4-K -i-v^r-, T O^O S -f- ti tt* /^ ^ ? r\ ±,-nrri p t,nm"i"f"£i"f""in'r'0 ;'' -r *n .o or 1 or +
Such improvements as MIBVed warheads could destablize
the arms race if they become to accurate, fhey then
provide a counterforce capability with a first-strike
threat. ^ fo protect against this possible Soviet
development, the kixon Administration has moved towards
developing a counterforce, first-strike nuclear posture
for the U.S.,
fhe Fiscal i'ear 1975 defense budget contains three
new cotmterfor ce-related requests already mentioned in
•3
-chultze, pp. 1 i 1; - !; 6.
• ;on^ p. 6. , cols. 2-6.




this paper: vSp million for improving the accuracy of
warheads » v-25 million for work on a land based missile
with greater explosive power than present U.o« missiles,
and *82 million to develop MAHV's, improving the
evasive capabilities of missiles.
fhe present administration's arguments to develop
a limited response option to the "assured destruction"
doctrine are not accepted by all critics of U.o. strategic
doctrine. Some argue that such a Soviet attack is
inconceivable. The reasoning is that the Soviets would
recognize from the outset that a counterforce attack
limited to missile sites
5
communications or control
centers, or other military installations would cause
so much damage that it would be difficult to distinguish
frcm an attack on civilian population centers and wouln
inevitably lead to catastrophic general nuclear war.
In addition, critics contend that measures to increase
missile accuracy would further destabilize the strategic
arms race because the Soviets could interpret such
developments as moves towards a first-strike capability
and would be forced to increase their own development
programs to off-set perceived American advances. Such
measures would run counter to the objective of mutual
stability and defeat strategic arms limitations
negotiations, ^lso, the development of a n -force,
limited response option, lias been oppose >ly because
it suggests that strategic war could be 'ou tit without
27

large-scale destruction and thereby increases the dancer
of general war. h5 The development of a United response
option is one of the strategic issues that U.S. leaders
will debate during the years ahead.
GU-;AS-hT-lS
If such an option is developed, and it appears
,
at present, that the necessary technological advances
will be undertaken, this provision for a counterforce
doctrine could reconcile the contradiction that has
developed between U.J. global strategic posture and
U.S. supported KAT.O doctrine. If one accepts the
argument that limited nuclear exchanges need not escalate
to retaliatory attacks on Soviet and U.o. cities, then
both NATO and U.S. strategic doctrine can be reconciled
to support counterforce doctrine.
Would such a conciliation enable the United States
to firmly reiterate a nuclear guarantee to Western
^urope '' 1 believe it would not* The issue of damage
limitation and the risk of escalation to strategic counter-
city exchanges will not have been resolved by a new
counterforce option to the U.6. strategic deterrent,
American cities will still remain vulnerable, end the
rationality of man's actions once nuclear weapons have














in question. 1'he United States can firmly reiterate its
nuclear guarantee to V/estera Europe only by demonstrating
that the survival of that area remains vital to U.S.
security, The U.S. must translate into deeds these
words spoken by -"resident Ki::on in an address to the
American people on February 25, 1971 :
Cur U.S. ties with Western -urope are
central to the structure of peace because
its nations are rich in tradition and
experience, strong economically, vigorous
in diplomacy ana culture; they are in a
position to take a major part in building
a world of peace,
. . .
.Looking ahead in --urope:
.-.'e shall cooperate in our political and
economic relations across the Atlantic as
the Common Market grows.
»;e and our allies will make the
improvements necessary to carry out our
common defense strategy,
-together we stand ready to reduce our
forces in western Europe in exchange, for
mutual reductions in -astern -urope. H~°
IHS i/^AK^HIKG OF AMERICA'S IIATO CGki-IIThJIH
The U.S. has been plagued by a foreign policy
credibility gap since the Kennedy administration, and
this gap, more than any contradiction between national
strategic deterrent policy and l.k-.TO defense policy,
has intensified doubts concerning the United States 1
commitment to provide support to allied nations. Events
have occurred which may have weakened U.S. resolve or,
at least, appeared to have weakened America's will in the




eyes of Europeans »• The Kennedy administration seemed to
have difficulty grasping the extent of the limitations
as well as the extent of its power, The Bay of Pigs
fiasco demonstrated to Europeans that -'resident Kennedy
^,;as not in full command of his Administration. This ill-
fated venture has been described as -resident Kennedy's
greatest blunder in foreign affairs*"''' J-n addition, the
Kennedy Administration engineered the Skybolt Crisis,
and intensified America's involvement in Viet Nan. This
involvement, intensified further by Presidents Johnson
and Nixon during the following decade, has been the most
important single element in the tragic estrangement
between the U.S. and its European allies. The
miscalculations in that war has torn into the American
society and. has created doubt in Europeans that the U.d.
will defend -urope in all circumstances. Franz "Josef
otrauss, in his book Challenge and A'crjr-o n.'LS j reprinted
an article by Lothar Kuehl in ^xo Welt, April K, 1967,
which foresaw the consequences to -urope of America's
involvement in Vietnam!
The idea that America is certain to defend
-urope in all circumstances, even in the absence
oi? an adequate European effort, is false.
Clearly, this notion has now in any cr.se been
shaken.. Europe can trust --morica only so
long as the -uropean nations show therns i Ives
more worthy of trust and confidence than
oouth Vietnam, ^urope cannot afford to
trust -:, rice Lndly and cannot 1 v bhe
burden and responsibility of in ctj . ; i fcs
'' Nunnerley, pp» 1*+8-1h-9«
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nations exclusively to whoever happens to
bo President of the USA*
..i.ie. the statesmen who were in office at
the time of the alliance's greatest era —
have again and again tried to impress upon
Europeans, to wit that nothing in this
world can be had free of charge and that
America can and will only help those who
are prepared to help themselves."*"*3
••hat the future holds is uncertain, b ,-»- -01rone,
and --mericans alike are aware of the changed atmosphere
—
the loss of confidence in America's ability and desire
to effectively lead the KATO Alliance,. In 1961,
President Kennedy promised in his Inaugural Address:
...Let every nation know, whether it
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose
any foe to assure the survival and the
success of liberty. ^9
In the space of just ten years that dedicated,
magnificent rhetoric, mired down by overinvolvement
in Vietnam, has been supplanted by the Nixon doctrine:
The world has changed. Our U.S.
foreign policy must change with it.
•ie have learned in recent years the
dangers of overinvolvement. The other
danger — a grave risk we are equally
determined to avoid — is under-
involvement. After a long and unpopular
war, there is temptation to turn inward —
to withdraw from the world, to back away
\ from our commitments. That deceptively
I smooth road of the new isolationism is
surely the road to war.
Our foreign policy today steers a sto
course between the oast danger of overinvolvi tent
L
'' 8 Franz Josef Str; :, Ohnll
(he;/ Tork: ^eidenfeld an --Lcolson, Ltd., lo.J, .1 1 -1
lf 9 1,'unn irley, p. ?. .).
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and the new temptation of underinvolvement
.
That policy, which I first enunciated in
^uam 19 months ago, represents our basic
approach to the world*
,ie will maintain our commitment's, but we
will make sure our own troop levels or any
financial support to other nations is appropriate
_to current threats and needs,
,'e shall provide a shield if a nuclear
power threatens the freedom of a nation allied
with us or of a nation whose survival we
'"consider viral to our security,
—--But we will look to threatened countries
and their neighbors to assume primary
responsibility for their own defense, and
we will provide support where our interests
call for that support and where it can make
a difference.
These principles are not limited to
security matters , 50
LESSORS FROM 1112 BERLIN CRISIS
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 illustrates two points.
First, the crisis illustrated that U.S. resolve to use
nuclear weapons to defend western Europe was not
increased by a lack of contradiction between U.S.
global strategic doctrine and NATO nuclear doctrine.
All Ut-S* deterrent forces at that time operated under
the doctrine of "massive retaliation". In addition, the
U.S. was not exposed to the danger of devastation in
the event of war in 1961. Soviet strategic forces were
not adequate for the task,?''
Second, the U.S. did not give in to soviet demands,
nor did Khrushchev push the crisis to the point at which
50 President Nixon's address, pp. 1+22-1+23«
<" otrauss, p. Wr.
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no option remained other than nuclear war because he
realised that the American people were willing to fight
for Berlin. Berlin was the touchstone to American
honor, an essential foundation in the structure of the
Atlantic Community, and the American people over-
whelmingly support..'- the rights of the city,^2 American
soldiers stationed in Europe and supported by an
arroused American public, not the doctrine of U.S.
strategic forces, represented the resolve of the American
people.
SIM-IARY
fhe sovereign nations comprising the Atlantic
Community have not always agreed on major issues,
differences in perspective should not be surprising nor
should such differences be allowed to become threatening
to any IBVXO nation's security or national self-interest,
much has been accomplished during the past decade by
effective negotiations within the Community, fhe I-uclear
Test-Ban Treaty, the "Kennedy Hound" of trade negotiations,
and the "Smithsonian Accord" to realign exchange rates
are just a few examples of accord reached on vital issues
of mutual interest. In the years ahead, Americans must
convince Europeans and themselves as well that the
survival of Burope indeed remains vital to U.o. security




and continue to conduct effective consultation in areas
of mutual concern, fo fail to do so, v:ill signal a
lessening in importance of Europe to America and will
continue to undermine the credibility of the U.3»
nuclear guarantee to -urope.
3k

Tactical nucle.ar weapons have a controversial
history. In NATO, two roles for these weapons hove
been distinguished!
1. to deter the use of similar weapons
by Soviet forces, and
2. to deter a Soviet attack with conventional
weapons and to counter such an attach
should it occur.''
It is generally agreed that tactical nuclear
weapons in the hands of EAIO forces in ^urope provide
considerable deterrent value against Soviet use of
tactical nuclear weapons and a reasonably credible
deterrent against Soviet conventional attack, This is
true not onl Tr because the tactical weapons themselves
can inflict high costs on an enemy's forces, but also
because their use, or an enemy's pre-emptive strike
against them would sharp!:/ raise the probability that
the war would escalate to all-out dimensions.^ Halberstam
in f he, Best, „and.
,
the, „3r ightest stated the problem of
escalation most succinctly:
...in the Pentagon's war games there always
seemed to be a problem with the tactical
1 Schultz, p. 9 !+~95.
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nuclear weapons* No natter which side fired
first, the other side would retaliate, and
everytiir.e without fail it would somehow expand
to strategic weapons; whoever was behind on
the little stuff would let fly with the big.
stuff.
3
^s a supplement to conventional forces, tactical
nuclear weapons can contribute to deterrence by adding
uncertainty to an enemy's plans for aggression. The
crucial and controversial question is to what extent
Ih-i.ru should rely on tactical nuclear weapons as an
alternative to conventional forces for deterrence and
defense in Europe, '
Thai RADFORD PLAN
The Radford Plan, submitted to NATO in 1957, placed
reliance for Western European defense primarily upon
tactical ana strategic nuclear weapons. Under the
Radford Plan, NATO conventional forces were a "trip-
wire", an impediment to ascertain Soviet intentions
and allow U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear forces
time to deploy. Conventional forces were a "shield" of
immense psychological value intended to support the U.S.
nuclear "sword" of "massive retaliation". The Radford
Plan was appealing to Europeans and Americans for several
3 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest
,
(Greenwich, Conn. s Pawcett Publications, 1972) , pp. 297-293,
^ Schu.lt ze, p, 9lh t
' Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 21-35*
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reasons. The possibilities of nuclear weapons permitted
KATO to reduce force level requirements from ninety-six
to thirty divisions t Thirty divisions was a r.uch more
credible requirement, because actual KATO force levels
had never come close to ninety-six divisions, the number
determined in 195*+ as necessary for "forward strategy"
to defend Germany as far to the east as possible. The
Hadford Plan offered a "forward strategy" with force-
levels that could be maintained by KATO nations."
T-i-LC'TlCAL KUCLiiAR WEAPONS hS A YxiiBL-j -Oi'TiOK
^ring the late 1950' s and early 1960's, it had
become clear that strategic nuclear forces were an
ineffective form of power in local conflict and could not
deter local wars* They had not prevented Communists from
conducting guerrilla actions or from using open force
in Korea and Southeast Asia. In crisis after crisis, it-
had become clear that the U.S. was not willing to invoke
"massive retaliation", it was not a credible response
except in the most extreme circumstance — direct soviet --
U«S. confrontation. Tactical nuclear weapons were thought
to provide a viable option short of "massive retaliation".'
° Kunnerley, p«* 65*
7
-nthoven, p« 123*
Charles J. Hitch, and Holand K. Mckean., T]ie.
economics o f /-Jof.ens.e „ in the i-'u,c, r\cnr ii -i-i:Te T (hew ^ork.
"theneuM, 1973;", PP« 350~3?2.
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'•The deterrent value of tactical nuclear weapons
was great in the late 195 (~;, s, and remains so today, and
it was generally believed that the controlled use of
small-yield nuclear weapons against strictly military
Q
targets could keep collateral damage low. --Iso, tactical
nuclear weapons provided an alternative to the holocaust-
or-humiliation dilemma of strategic nuclear weaDons.
QUESTIONING Tkd ASSUMPTIONS SUPPORTING T^CflCAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The assumptions underlying these supposed acvantages
offered by tactical nuclear weapons were subject to
debate. Charles J. Hitch and Poland N. KcKean in The
Economics of defense in the Nuclear, -•-?;e
J
questioned the
soundness of using tactical nuclear weapons, and stated
that qnrno p-f "hVira nvono^pl ° for1 -ic-'-pr t'noqo '.taonnrit; '.-qt>o
quite reckless. First, they rejected the notion that
nuclear weapons favor the defender rather than the
aggressor and that NATO could depend on then to compensate
for men and conventional arms. 'The ••/est lacked a monopoly
on these weapons-, even as early as I960 when their work
was published, and no convincing evidence had indicated
that tactical nuclear weapons favored the defender rather
than the aggressor if both sides used such weapons. Their






The argument runs that the offense requires
concentration and so the aggressor necessarily
provides the defender with a lucrative ator.de
target,, -his ignores the fact that, in a
delivered nuclear weapon itself, the offence
has an enormous concentration of force. fhe
use of nuclear weapons in United wars night
make it possible for the aggressor to eliminate
the existing forces of the defender and to get
the war over, reaching his limited objective
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a premium on surprise ana iorces in oemg
rather than on mobilization potential, which
is the area in which the >'/est has an advantage. '
Kitch and 'hchean further questioned the assumption
that limited nuclear warfare could be limited to the
immediate area of battle?
Nuclear limited war, simply because of
the extreme swiftness and unpredictability
of its moves, tee necessity of delegating
authority to local commanders and the
possibility of sharp and sudden desperate
reversals of fortune, would put the greatest
strain on the deterrent to all-out thermonuclear
war
«
for this reason we believe that it would
be appropriate to emphasize the importance
of expanding a conventional capability
realistically, and in particular, research
and development in non-nuclear modes of
warfare. '^
fhese statements summarized hitch and '-clean's
findings from their KA1-7D Corporation research study of
defense issues during the late 1950's. Charles hitch, in
1961, became Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
in the U.S. Department of Defense, his views were shared
by defense Secretary KcKamara, Assistant Secretary
9 Hitch, pp. 351-352.
10 hitch, p. 3:52.
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j^nthoven, and President Kennedy. Secretary McKamara
thus '"'set out to harness the might, to control it, and
to being some order and rationality to it, and scon,
above all, to limit the use of nuclear weapons". ^
One of the KcKamara teams major efforts, develop-
ment of a secure second-strike capability, discussed
earlier in this paper, was not of particular concern
to -Europeans, Respite intense inter-service debate in
the U.o« } American nuclear \vreapons continued to protect
NATO nations. As the doctrine of "assured destruction"
developed during the decade, a contradition developed
between U.S. national strategic doctrine and KATO
policies, but this contradiction was not immediately
discernable, and Europeans did not seriously object to
this U«d. defense shift in emphasis in the early 1960 ! s.
Indeed, the Europeans and Americans, in general, were
impressed by the Achamara "cost-effectiveness" analysis,
various gaming techniques, the use of operations analysis
and the supposed dependence on new computer systems.
Projects undertaken to strengthen and protect
command and communications facilities from Soviet attack
were seen as desirable, but when controls and safeguards
were placed on tactical nuclear weapons to prevent
accidental or unauthorized launching, both the U.S.
military and European leaders voice dissatisfaction. io
11 Halberstam, p. 297.
12 Bpodie, p.- 196.
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the U.3. military, this meant downgrading of the field
coriander, not trusting his professional judgement as
a senior Military officer. In theory, the decision to
use nuclear weapons was always the President's, but in
practice, senior U.S. military officers felt that they
could make the decision to use the weapons based or; their
judgement in the event that communications failed. "* 3
European apprehensions were raised by the centrali-
zation of command and control in trie hands of the U.d,
President, i'his move underscored the dependence of K.ixi.
allies upon major decisions taken in Washington, fhis
development was especially threatening because of Soviet
advances in missile technology, in 1957, the soviet
Union had launched Sputnik 1 and clearly demonstrated a
T-v>n:j-' nr ^^tt'' of r» r; "n r. r* """ "f~ - r "ho T Tn"Pl "i r>+" rilpl ^n-p oo^ i'r'n,^ t"i ori u nJ.^b — ^/.j.w« v^v-j^^w^. -sj «~ .~ __ .- »._'._J X '_• '-_ Ll'_ L-_!_ _>__
upon the United States. European confidence in the
willingness of the United States to employ nuclear
weapons of any hind to defend Europe was on the wane
as the United States had become increasingly vulnerable
to Soviet nuclear attach. lightening command and control
was perceived by Europeans as a lessening of America s
desire to allow the use of nuclear weapons in --urope.
CONV3HTI0HAL FORGE BUILD-UP
while U.S. strategic forces were being reoriented,
1 3 Halberstara, p. 297.
1l+ Pfaltzgraff, p. 33.
Kissinger, I'he. froublod Pnrtn rs.h.iji, pp. 109-111.
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and h'c^amara's "'-.'his Kids" were rethinking the role- of
tactical nuclear weapons, the Berlin Crisis of 1961
tool: place, '-i-'his crisis underscored the necessity of
having strong conventional forces to support a nuclear
deterrent, i'he Kennedy administration immediately began
to build-up American conventional forces and pressed IwVI'O
allies to increase their own force levels.
Secretary AGl.'amara outlined the necessity for
increasing allied conventional force levels to enhance
the credibility of the U.cJ, nuclear arsenal in two major
speeches during 1962. ne spoke before the NATO delegates
in Athens and again stressed the importance of conventional
forces at the Commencement exercises in Arm Arbor, Michigan.
i'he following is froze his Ann Arbor speech?
If we have shown ourselves able and
ready to engage in large scale non-nuclear
warfare in response to a Communist provoca-
tion, the '-•ovists can hardly misconstrue two
things? first, that we regard provocation
as a challenge to our vital interests; and
second, that we will use nuclear weapons to
prevail, if this becomes necessary. ^
'fhe positive case for a major conventional option
was straightforward to the Kennedy Administration. i'lrst,
conventional forces could counter Soviet aggression or
threats of aggression without the strain on the unity of
the alliance that using nuclear weapons would entail.
ouch a capability offered an alternative to "suicide or
surr- nder" and would underpin diploma ;:ic 'action in
>5 Acbamara, Commencement address, p. 9»
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peacetime anu support firm resistance in crisis. In
addition, a major conventional option could provide the
hind of military diversification to facilitate actions
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. ^6
Also, it was argued that conventional \;eapons cause
far less collateral than nuclear weapons, i'ron past
experience, it was known that favorable military results
could he achieved using conventional forces, hut tactical
nuclear weapons represented entry into an unknown area
of major uncertainty, uf equal importance, the risks of
escalation to general nuclear war appeared substantially
smaller in conventional battles than in tactical nuclear
conflict. Moreover, the hchamara team, felt that a
conventional option in NATO would reduce the premium on
1 7the American nuclear guarantee. '
Despite the deficiencies of tactical nuclear weapons,
the b'nitea States did not advocate their removal from NATO.
The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations maintained that these
weapons did have an important, if limited, role and
complimented a strong conventional capability. U.o.
Defense Department studies during the early 1960's
suggested four reasons for retaining a nuclear option:
1. Tactical nuclear weapons were already
stockpiled in Europe, -o remove then would
have raised the specter of an imminent U.S.
1, 6 Dnthoven, p. 130.
' ^nthoven, p. 130.
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withdrawal from ^urope. J-herefore, maintain-
ing the presence of these weapons helped
reassure the allies of U.o. will to use
whatever weapons were necessary for their
defense,
2. Tactical nuclear weapons contributed to
the deterrence of conventional as well as
nuclear aggression, -hey placed iniiibitiohs
on the enemy and forced him to face the
prospect that initiation of a conventional
conflict might prompt a nuclear response.
If he massed his forces for a conventional
attact, as was probable, it would be exactly
the wrong deployment to receive a nuclear
strike,
3. tactical nuclear weapons would deter a
first use of tactical nuclear weapons by the
Soviets, Without such a capability, the Soviets
might be tempted to launch pre-emptive nuclear
strikes against NATO forces, <;ith tactical
nuclear weapons the U.S» could credibly
threaten extensive damage to Soviet forces
in retaliation.
h. minally, tactical nuclear weapons
repres .nted a hedge against the possible
failure in other parts of the iha'O force
posture. If conventional forces failed,

tactical nuclear weapons could taen be
used to halt Soviet aggression. °
TTT
-f ' . ' J
General maxwell laylor, in
__
had in I960 specified what the role of conventional
forces should be in a credible military program, he
state! that the U.3. must have counter-attrition- forces
capable of extending the scope of potential military
action across the entire spectrum of possible challenge
in accordance with a strategy of "Flexible desponse".
In his vie'.;, o.S. conventional forces in Europe had an
important role in both general and limited warfare. In
general war, they would hold the enemy at arms length
while heavy weapons were maneuvered into battle. In
other words, sizeable conventional forces were necessary
to force the enemy to concentrate his forces mailing
him extremely vulnerable to conventional or nuclear
attack. -dLso, defensive forces must have enough
residual strength to regain lost torrotory or occupy
enemy lands and claim a victory. r'or a limited. war,
conventional forces must be strong enough to turn bach
infiltrations, raids, and border forays to gain the
time to discern an enemy's intentions*
In addition to purely military considerations,
18 dnthoven, pp. 1 2^-1 3 : -"

General Baylor recognised that U. « forcer deployed in
Europe performed a very important psychological role.
£hev exemplified American willingness to share the
hazards of living within gunshot of the ^onununists.
fhose forces represented America's will to uphold 'U« S,
security commitments. General Taylor argued that o.3.
conventional forces must have the equipment, supplies,
and a munitions necessary for six months of combat.
Thereafter expanded war production would begin to take
over ti-e bur o.en. ' '
r-t-'- -, i-ir-'^T T T -'~l~" /" '" ATP P7 "^\'TI"JT r 3 ''' T '"~ "
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I'he honnedy Administration borrowed heavily fro:::
General Taylor's arguments to develop .a new- strategic
doctrine to provide for greater flexibility than lied
the strate^v of "massive retaliation", liiitiallv the
new strategy of "flexible response" provided for a
conventional defense against a conventional Soviet
!...- \J *-/ ^ --.j
equipped for ninety cieys combat to allow tq£' rve forces
time to deploy and to allow for expanded war production.
In the event of Soviet attack, NATO and Warsaw Jdact
nations, 'would be allowed the opportunity to re-evaluate
their actions before nuclear arms were committed to battle,
Conceivably, a soviet attack would be halted with NATO
conventional forces, but if conventional forces foiled,
19 Gen. rai Maxwell >\ Taylor, __hg_„
(hew dork; harper '-- how, I960), pp. 13' -T^-o.
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five years are cast question on U.P. steadiness and
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-urc; sen Military and political leaders who had
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i-a ,t Tiitpd fiir*tV'-. ma
suspicions when, in 1963, he relieved General horstad
as o.-^GdUiie This action was done without erior consultations
with IhifO allies, and" was unsettling to allied govmrmont;:
who considered Sh3nU;L an allied post, subordinate equally
to all the jgovernr.ie:
horstad had questioned the soundness o
20 Pfaltzgraff, pp. 33-36.
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and had gained the respect of European leaders for his unread-
iness to accept the doctrine. Kis replacement, General Lyman
Lemnitzer, came to the post with a kind of stigma that could
do him or the Kennedy Administration no good. He had been
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the
Bay of Pigs and had added his consent to that incredible
operation. His arrival in Europe fanned speculation that
Kennedy wanted him out of Washington and signalled that
the post of SAG3UR was of lessened importance.
Many specific criticisms were raised against the
new doctrine. First, it was inconceivable to many,
that the Soviets would attack with conventional and not
nuclear weapons. Analysis of Soviet military strategy
indicated that the Soviets consistently stressed the
desirability uo stride qtu.cj£iy wiwh nuclear weapons oo
depress enemy troops morally, lower their combat ability,
upset command, and quickly create conditions for completing
the enemy's defeat. 2^" Charles Hitch and Hoiand K, McKean
in I960 had argued the following in I'he Economics of
defense in the Huclear A^et
We are inclined to believe that most of those who
rely on tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute for
disparities in conventional forces have in general
presupposed a cooperative Soviet attacker, one who did
not use atomic weapons himself. Here again is an instance
of Western preferred Soviet strategies, this time applied
to limited war. 2?
2
~> Brodie, pa. 198-199. .
24- V.U. Sokolovski, Soviet Mi li t rr: Strategy, Unglewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963 )., Chapter 4-.
l'revor Cliffe , Military fechnolbgv and the. European
valance , Adelphi Papers, n'r. 8.9 , C.London s international Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 3^~37»

^hus, in I960, Hitch argued that NATO must increase
conventional force levels to counter a Soviet nuclear attack.
Two years later, as an important member of the U.S. Defense
Department he was arguing that NATO, must increase conven-
tional force levels to counter Soviet attack with conven-
tional forces. The reasoning behind the complete reversal
of his viewpoint was not clear or acceptable to everyone.
The McKamara Defense Department stressed that tactical
nuclear weapons provided' such an effective deterrent that
the Soviets would not attack with similar weapons. Still,
critics argued that by delaying the introduction of nuclear
weapons until NATO forces were on the verge of collapse,
the doctrine of "flexible response" actually undermined any
deterrent value that these weapons might have, henry
Kissinger, among others argued that the use of nuclear
weapons w.uGii on oiic vcr^e o± ucj-cdo uwu.j_u. oiOuai/Aj xiw o iuuaoe
the Soviets to stop fighting, father, it would signal that
NATO forces were on the verge of collapse and would cause
Soviet forces to intensify their efforts. Worse conditions
could not be imagined for transmission of nuclear release
orders to the battle zone. Forces on the verge of defeat
would hardly be able to maintain communications or gather
intelligence concerning enemy troop dispositions to be
able to use tactical nuclear weapons. °
25 Hitch, p. 352.
26 Hunt, pp. 22-2H.






-he doctrine of "flexible response" appeared to be
a means to limiting war to the European continent. U.d.
attempts to raise the threshold of nuclear action
threatened to turn Europe into a major battlefield for
+ he third time this century, Europeans visualised a
European continent overrun by conventional forces and
finally destroyed by nuclear weapons. ?7 -he issue of
collateral damage has always been central to Europeans,
especially to the Germans who share a border with the
Soviet Bloc in Central Europe. German efforts had been
primarily instrumental in persuading the alliance to
accept the forward strategy in 195^ to- prevent Germany
from being overrun while KATO forces were developing to
their potential.- Again, in 1962, Germany proposed a
short conventional defense with a low nuclear threshold
to ascertain Soviet intentions. Almost immediately,
tactical nuclear weapons would be used in the conflict
zone. Assuming that the ^oviets did not first launch a
preemptive disarming strike, nuclear holocaust would be
limited to the border area,
i'he Kennedy Administration countered with the
argument that collateral damage from conventional weapons
would be far less than fall out and immediate damage from
27 i/ynfred Joshua, husljl^-jhlmf:^^
Alliance
,
(hew -forks national strategy information ^ont r,
1973; , PP. 32-3 1'.
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-'ranee opposed, vigorously the buildup of conventional
forces, arguing that "flexible response" embodied many of
the features of military strategy of previous wars, -he
massing of conventional armies was not appropriate because
it exposed such armies to nuclear attach, In the vie.- of
d-eneral ---illeret, the presence of large scale armies,
together with the ^nerican strategic doctrine of "flexible
response" might not deter, but might have tempted a Soviet
strike against ••estern Europe in the expectation of win-
ning a non-nuclear victory,, The .French, like the Germans,
thought that tactical nuclear weapons were a credible
deterrent only if they would be used without delay in
29
response to a ooviet thrust westward. '
The argument frequently cited to counter this
position has been that sufficient levels of conventional
forces are necessary to force an enemy to concentrate his
"in
forces and make him vulnerable to nuclear attack.
°
u
The disagreement concerning conventional forces and
tactical nuclear weapons continued without resolve until
1967 when the NATO Committee for defense Planning adopted
a compromise strategy based on a three step "flexible
response".- This doctrine which is still in effect today,
provides for a first stage of direct defense — mainly by
29 Pfaltzgraff, p. 33.
Joshua, p. L!-0«
30
-drithoven, pp. 126-1 30.
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using conventional forces. Should this fail, the second
stage — that of deliberate escalation — would folio;.-,
fhis phase, would consist of the use of nuclear w aporis
for selective strikes against enemy forces and targets
within tactical range behind the enemy front. Should
none of this produce the desired effect, strategic strikes
against the soviet 'union could be ordered. i'liese three
phases will not be treated as strictly separate in ter:..s
of tine and space, but each stage may have some of trie
characteristics of the other two.-^
fhe actual agreement on the three step doctrine is
less interesting than the conditions that facilitated the
agreement. Robert Pfaltzgraff, representing an kmerican
viewpoint, states that the withdrawal of -'ranee from
members to reach at least a formal level of strategic
consensus.-1 ^ ^'ranz Josef Strauss, ->;est Serman befense
hinister at the time of the agreement, views the
situation somewhat differently, he states that" the
ambivalence of American policy — from deterrence to
relaxation — facilitated the agreement. In his view,
the U.3» supported this revision of doctrine as a
carefully graduated concession, a "good example" to
alio 1./ trust to grow in the Soviet Union, fhis action,
along with reductions In U.S. troop levels in Germany
3^ Strauss, pp. ?0~53»
3 2 pfaltzgraff, p. h2.
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which also occurred in 196?, vac- a -signal that America
was ready to join in a. gradual disengagement and
progressive denuclearisation.-^
Strauss' viev; strikes at the heart of i:.uch of
Europe's criticism of American nuclear doctrine, fhe
argument proceeds that the U.S. desires to raise the
nuclear threshold because of the increasing vulnerability
of -"knerican cities to Soviet strategic attach, fhe
strategy of "flexible response" is a doctrine of
controlled warfare betraying signs of "Vietnamization"
designed to keep conflict below the nuclear threshold
to enable the U.S. to pursue Kissinger-style diplomatic
negotiations with the Soviet Union.
In this scenario j it is open to question whether,
the U.S. would make available the tactical nuclear weapons
stationed in -Surope, and even more doubtful that the U.S.
would launch strategic weapons, '-Co Strauss, the U.S.
views I'hVfO as an "arms control" device and has tried to
maintain close control over nuclear weapons for the past
decade, ^s support for these arguments', Strauss cites
the realities of the Soviet's growing missile technology,
the vigor with which the U.S. pursued the Nuclear 'lest
Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty, and' various
devices which the U.S. pursued to keep control of nuclear
weapons from Europeans, ie, hLF and sharp criticism of




independent European nuclear forces, ^trauss fears that
the centralisation of nuclear command and control in the
office of the fresident of the United States, coupled
with U.S. desires to avoid nuclear warfare, has under-
mined the credibility of the ^#S. strategic ana tactical
deterrent. -'he European fear is that the superpoaa rs will
negotiate an "understanding" regarding central -urope's
future (German concern for reunification) that will
leave Europeans subject to superpoxver dictates, Thus,
European nations who are concerned about sovereignty
would lose their ability to control their future.
j-'his sort of reasoning based on misperceptions and
partial truths is being reinforced by American actions.
U.S. Senator Henry Jackson has deplored the lack of
effective consultation within the Atlantic Community,
He has criticised U»o. handling of the Strategic Arms
limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, stating that U.J.
arms control policies are based upon a concept that would
limit U.S. strategic forces to retaliate only in the
event of a direct attack upon the United States. i'hat
may be an overstatement, but Senator Jackson argues that
such a belief has been reinforced by the lack of consulta-
tion with NATO allies prior to the negotiations. He
doubts that the U.o. practice of briefing NATO allies
after each stage of the negotiations effectively assuages
Strauss, Chapters h and 10.
9,

European fears of a U.6,-Soviet deal or U.6, withdrawal
from ^urope.--
' kJ _.*'>_, V..' t.J
The disserisus surrounding the use of tactical nuclear
weapons stems fro... two related iccues. First, disagreement
among allies exists regarding how much value should be
placed on the deterrent and defensive capabilities of
these weapons. European arguments during the last decade
stressed the need for Usuiting collateral damage ar.d for
developing a forward strategy to defend ""est Germany
as far to the Sast as possible, and tactical nuclear
weapons were seen as substitutes for conventional forces,
hyths about the -^ed Army's sise and capability stressed
the futility of NATO's attempting to meet the Soviets
with conventional weapons. The ^chamara Defense
Department conducted extensive studies during the early
196C e s to ascertain true Soviet force levels and
capabilities but attempts to persuade »est Europeans
that NATO could and should place greater emphasis on
conventional weapons failed 9 ^°
Today, the dissensus of tactical nuclear weapons
seems to be based upon another myth involving the Soviet
Union's intentions in western Europe. Western Europe
3^ "Senator Jackson Heviews Lessons of SALT One",
^viat lon ;-oe " : and ...'r.pace /lechnolp-Ty * 11 ^ec, 1972, pp. 53"!?5»
3o see Snthoven, especially chapter H-.
5?

perceives an overt soviet military threat as extremely
low. 37 indeed, no one seriously thinks that the Soviets
would invade western Europe, Reasons forwarded for this
perception arc that the Soviets will not risk direct
confrontation with the U»3*, are experiencing severe
domestic technological and agricultural difficulties and
are deeply concerned about possible hostilities with
the Chinese.
This perception is reinforced by force reduction
negotiations with the V/arsaw *~: act, increased trade
negotiations with ^astern Surope, and increasing
.
public statement; ay Western leaders to the effect that
"the danger of global conflict has diminshed ,, .3o The
greater contacts between ^ast and West have weakened
the solidarity of the Western Alliance*, and as has been
discussed, America's lack of consultation with NATO
partners before pursuing bilateral negotiations with
the Soviets has probably contributed to European
sentiments that America is abandoning her commitment to
defend Europe. West European nations have also conducted
bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and Hast
European nations.. France, under HeGaulle, pursued
better relations with the Soviet Union and, more recently,
West Germany has become the first NATO nation to sign a
3? Pfaltzgraff
, p. 59.
33 Henry A, Kissinger. "Pacem in Terris Address", Jjiiacem,




non-aggression pact with the soviet Union.
One of the provisions of the 1970 -Treaty of i-oseow
negotiated by the soviet Union and .''est Germany v/as the
renunciation of the use of military force in Central
Europe, This has contributed to an antinuclear bias in
the West German Social democratic and the Free democratic
parties who consider it politicolly expedient to avoid
public discussions of nuclear warfare,, The Brandt
Administration has played down the role of nuclear
weapons in an eagerness to project a more acceptable
West German image to the -ast. Gstpolitik SJid detente
have heightened the dissensus surrounding the use of
tactical nuclear weapons as NATO nations attempt to
develop a defense and deterrent posture . commensurate
with the diminishing Soviet military threat in Europe
but one that does not present an overeagerness to rely
on nuclear weapons to an extent that might damage the
present, fragile detente with the Soviet bnion.
The second root of dissensus concerns the
reliability of America s s commitment to Europe, Secretary
of State William P.. Rogers, in an address to Overseas
Writers on December 1, 1971, stated the following J
....the broadest interests of Western
-uropo and of the United States remain
inseparable. -*nd neither these (1971
temporary surcharge on imports) not any
other problems will cause us to abandon
our support of western European alliance
or our commitment to a strong NATO
alliance.





in the security field, or in the
political field -- into remoteness or
isolation from western -upope. father,
in recognition of U.S. — western European
interdependence in all these fields
.
nwe
will remain committed and involved. 3°
In the security field, the U.S. has not success-
fully demonstrated its commitment to NATO. During the
early 1960's, the hc^amara emphasis on conventional
weapons, even in the event of large scale war suggested
to many .Europeans that the ingenuity reflected in these
conceptions was not necessarily combined with political
or strategic wisdom, fhen, as the Vietnam conflict
intensified, the U.S. redeployed American forces fro:.:
Europe, signalling a possible lessening of interest in
Europe.
The American experience in Vietnam ended in witii-
drawal with honor rather than a military victory, and
the Nixon doctrine proclaims a new form of --merican
participation in the world. -America's task in the years
ahead will be to demonstrate to western Europe that
U.o. retreat from overinvolvement does not mean under-
involvement with Europe.
Today, neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union has a clearcut nuclear advantage, and this situation
has caused ^nericans to modify their attitudes towards
the problems of European defense, i'he U.S. does not
3^ William P. Rogers, "Our Permanent Interest in
Europe", U . o « For ei gn, , -"o 1 i cy
,




wish to avoid its responsibility to KATQ, but no nation
desires to initiate irresponsible acts that lead to
general nuclear war. Overreliance on either nuclear
weapons or conventional force is clearly tiie wrong path,
The task ahead for NATO is to balance the two types
of force into a militarily and politically credible
r -. ,~. *- ^ ->» r> or *~\ \~< r defensive force
9)

iivD spbndbnt buropban kuclbar forces
Henry ^is-inger has stated that NATO's nuclear
dilemma developed because of the increasing inconsistency
between the technical requirements of strategy and the
political imperatives of the nation-state. 'Three
factors have produced the difficulty: Cl) the need
for centralised control of military operations: (2) each
major ally's growing desire to have substantial influence
on common decisions, especially planning the controlled
operations envisioned by the doctrine of flexible response:
and (3) the wish to share in the prestige and political
power that nuclear weapons are thought to confer.
RATIONALE FOR BRITISH INDEPENDENT FORCES
In the British case, the desire to develop a
weapon to defeat Germany during World u'ar II was the
precipitating cause of British nuclear weapons research.
After the war, Britain decided to continue the program,
accelerating it with the development of the Oold War,
Notions of sovereignty, nationalism, and Great Power
status were behind Britain's postwar nuclear v/eapons
development program.
1 Kissinger, "The Troubled Partnership", pp. 11 7-1^8«
2 Richard N, Rosecrance, "international Stability
and Nuclear diffusion", ;m_mirjjieji_AAmAE^^ 2nd
edition, ed, ^-arlc E., Smith and ^laude o , Johns, Jr.,
(Baltimore, Hd. s John Hopkins Press, 1968J, p. 1^2.
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For many British the United kingdom had to hold its own
with the United States, haintaining nuclear research and
development programs testifies to their national tech-
nological prowess and is thought to secure them a
position at the "top table" at allied and wider
diplomatic negotiations, as well as upholding Britain's
position as the primary ally of tne United states.
3i'»^Gl-Jj rldiLjii X01\ SnlP B-i'l'ij.Limn' u«S» AJTD BHlTAXli
Britain has maintained a close but sometimes stormy
relationship with the U.S. in the field of nuclear weapon:
development. In secret wartime agreements, President
Hoosevelt and Prime minister Churchill pledged in 19*+3
to interchange information in the development of "tube
alloys" the British code name for nuclear weapons
development; and in 19'^} the two leaders agreed that
full cooperation between their governments for military
and commercial purposes should continue after the
Japanese defeat unless terminated by joint agreement.
At the close of the war, British and American attempts
to renegotiate these agreements foundered for several
reasons.
i-any
-'-Americans viewed atomic power as America's
"priceless secret heritage" ana were unwilling to share
3 Lawrence hartin, ^rms and Btr.ate.gv
,
(hew York!
David I-icJiay Co., 1973)? PP« 37-^0.
r Bean
->cheson, P_r.eson t at the Creation , (&ew iork!
Norton and Co., 1969 3, pp. 225-227.

further information. President Truman resisted enlarging
bilateral collaboration with Britain in 19^6 because the
U.S. Congress was considering the atonic Energy Act, and
the U.K. Atomic Energy Commission was discussing America's
proposal for international control of atomic energy.. Also,
senior military officers argued that the U.S. could not
give Britain any more fissionable material until America
had built more weapons.
fhe issue remained unresolved, but attempts to
reach a new agreement were spurred on by the 19L9 soviet
explosion of a nuclear device. Negotiations were frozen
in 1950 by a British spy s candle involving a British
scientist who had been working on the Manhattan Project
during the war and was convicted of passing information
ihe u.o. failed to completely honor its commitment
to exchange nuclear information with Britain until
General Eisenhower became President, he believed that
"our (U.S.) military fate and theirs (Britain) were so
interlocked that it made no sense to exclude one weapon ~~
which they would soon have anyway: -- from the scope of our
full partnership.- 'Aie attempt to do so was already
poisoning our relationship of mutual trust and if
continued, could jeopardise our alliance"./ President
5 Acheson, pp. 228-230,
Acheson, pp. ^1 lr-^21 •
' Acheson, p. • *+l 5»
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Eisenhower suimorted. a:r:endr:ient of the Atonic ^ner^v -ict.
materials and information were again exchanged, and the
natter was finally resolved without serious crisis in
either government.
In I960, the seeds were sown for a crisis involving
-•..glc-->mcrican nuclear weapons devoid pmant which
would bring the -nglo-j-merican special relationship to
its knees, in i'-arch I960, Brime Minister Baemillan cad
President Bisenhower met at Camp David and agreed that
Britain would purchase the Skyboit missile for use on
the British V-bomber strategic deterrent force. The
agreement was criticised in the British press as an
American move to insure British nuclear dependence.
Earlier, the U.S. had withdrawn support from the British
designed Blue Streak missile because the missile's
liquid™fuel propulsion system had been made obsolete
by U.S. advances in solid-fuel technology. The with-
drawal of support from .alue Streak and substitution of
Skyboit, even though the U.S. undertook the entire cost
of development, was greeted by London newspapers as a
political move to maintain America's v;eapons hegemony
within KATO,.8
After three years, U.S. Defense Secretary hcllamara
cancelled Skyboit citing cost overruns and a strategically
obsolete approach as the reasons. The i:npact on the
British government was devastating. Prime Binister
8 hunnerley, pp. 127-133.
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hacmlllan and his Conservative Administration had staked
"everything" or: the akybolt as an example of Anglo-
American cooperation. Britain's future as a nuclear
power appeared to be in doubt. Britain's relationship
with France was seriously underlined. General DeGaulle,
in 1963} enjoyed tremendous popular support in France.
The Algerian War was behind him, and French elections
had strengthened his hand at a time when Britain's ruling
Conservatives were seriously weakened and the American
government was suffering a credibility rap in the foreign
9policy area.-7
President Kennedy, at NASSAU, offered Polaris to
Britain under conditions that would preserve the credi-
bility of Britain's deterrent policy-r-Britain would
commit the for'ce to NATO but retain the right to with-
draw it in a national emergency.- British public
reaction to the Skybolt crisis and Nassau Agreement was
critical, arguing that the deal resulted in a Non-British
Dependent Nuclear Non-Deterrent I President Kennedy
offered Polaris to France on the same terms, but as David
Purinerley wrote in President Kennedy an d,..Britain?
"The General was much upset, Three weeks
later, the -:>lysee Palace shook with his three-
pronged reply to Kennedy's offers it was KON
to Polaris, KON to British entry into the
Common market, and, above all, NGN to the Grand
Design." 10
' Punnerley, pp. 151-1?3»
10 Kunnerley, p. 161*
eh

RATIONAL >J FOd Fd^KCrl IKi^PFHD-dvT FOUCi-iiS
France undertook to develop nuclear weapons in the
aftermath of the resounding defeat in Indo ^hina and the
beginning of the Algerian ^ar. At that time,' the b.j.
was relying on nuclear v;eapons (massive retaliation)
for the burden of military tasks, and the French
perceived that nuclear weapons might in some measure
compensate for past defeats and preveiit future ones,
i>uring the early 1960's, -^eGaulle came to perceive
France's nuclear weapons program as a tool to shape
•Europe's future, thereby guarantee France a predominant
role in that future. Factors already discussed in this
paper contributed to this perception -- the Kennedy
---di.'iinistration's performance during the Berlin crisis and
bay of iDigs invasion, b.d, insistance that NATO's doctrine
of "massive retaliation" be replaced by "flexible response",
U.S. insistance that European conventional force levels
be increased at a tine when the 13. o. t^as pur sizing policies
of arms limitation and non-proliferation -of nuclear weapons,
the growing capability of the soviet military and the
apparant declining American commitment to -airope. -hose
are just a few of the specific issues that may have
influenced- beGaulle to pursue an independent course hoping
to create a Europe centered around France's developing
nuclear raid economic strength, but the most compelling
iiosecrance, p.. 1 l-:-2.

reason must regain the French national concern for
independence* Valefy discard d* i^staing restated this
driving force in a recent interview with IIFd correspondent
George fader:
Fvery time that the G.d. seeks a frarJ:
dialogue, bearing in Kind our national conciiri:
for independence, problems can bo brought up Gnu,
J. think, solved, whenever, explicitly or other-
wise, the u.o. shows its will to predominate,
there should be no surprise at a French refusal.
The stated idea of an organized American leader-
ship of the western world is unacceptable, and
France cannot admit it, France can accept
partnership^ -but she cannot accept (American)
leadership.
French nuclear power was perceived by President
DeGaulle as symbolic of France's independence, by-
possessing nuclear power, the French could not be
pressured by either of the nuclear superpowers, -his
power was oo support trance s desire l.o esi>auxisn ^rencxi
primacy in -''estern Furope, while containing the U..3.
politically and economically.'' 3 French nuclear power
was to serve as the psychological mooring to tie Germany
securely to Western interests and align German economic
strength with France's European political ambitions.
12 George Tabor, "Goals for a Complicated Nation",
T,II-:i., dune 3, 197*+, p. 20.
1 3 f^obert Gilpin, France in the < ^e of the Scientific
e-te.t e, (Princeton? Princeton University rress, 196b;,
pp. Vr-15.




DiiGiiULL:J ' o JiUiiOPiLu* POLICY
French foreign policy efforts encountered difficulties
while operating from this premise, fvo notable setbacks
occurred in 1963 and 1966. In 1963, France sought to
create a Bonn-Paris axis around which European unification
could form. Both nations agreed in the French-German
I'reaty of Cooperation to formulate common economic and
foreign policies, including the coordination of military
strategy and weapons development, fhe French hoped the
treaty would provide the foundation for formulating
common -uropean policy towards U.ui. investments, leading
to the development of a nucleus for a European community
of sovereign nations independent of the United States. 5
Germany sought to contribute to the establishment
of a European federation into which she co~nld turn her
vast energies to good use without giving rise to revanchist
concern among other European nations. Germans such as
Franz Josef dtrauss see a European federation as a hope
for creating political ties with hestern -urope which
could make it possible to treat the German problem of
reunification as a common European concern. Fears of a
united Germany still linger in Europe, but if Germany
could become part of a more closely united Europe, fear
of a remilitarized and aggressive Germany might be
e I'mlimited. 16
1 ciJ GiipiR? -py, '+35°* Ii36.
6?

France sought to replace U.S. influence in Europe,
'West Germany was not willing to replace U.S. military
forces with French military pledges. West Germany has.
actively sought to maintain U.S. military presence in
Germany. In 1972 Chancellor Urandt stated that the gap
in military potential between the United States and
Western Surope is continuously widening and that Europe
alone could not guarantee her security effectively.
American troops leaving Europe could hardly be replaced
by Europeans, either with regard to their nuclear equip-
ment or their political and strategic power. ' fhe
West German government added a preamble to the treaty
restating German desires to maintain close economic and
military relationships with the United States. As a result
Oj. &j-i j. ermg perspectives cj.ose j-rencn auo. !-<Grmaii cooper-*
ation never developed.
i>uring the last decade, France made various attempts
to combine European nation-based industries to develop the
economies of scale necessary to compete with American
firms. Also, -'ranee attempted to persuade European
nations to limit American investment in European industries.
France proposed in 1966 that Common market nations
develop a uniform corporate law based upon an accord
reached among the member states as a step towards
combining nation-based industries,, i'he Common Market
'16 Strauss, pp. 115-117,
1 7 Willy Brandt, "Germany's Westpolitik", Fpre.ign,.




Commission pointed out that such uniformity in national
lavs would not solve how to transfer the headquarters of
a corporation from one country to another with lengthy
formalities, ±--or could such a lav; overcome differences
in various nations 1 tax systems, or a wide variety of
existing merger statutes and bankruptcy regulations.
The Commission proposed the formulation of a body of
European law creating equality for corporations and
shareholders so mergers would not involve a change of
nationality. ° To the French, such a bold step would
nave oeen an invasion oi sovereignty ana coma nave
frustrated national economic policies, it would have
created multinational Corporations (KN.Cs) which could
have removed a significant part of a nation's economy
from responsible national control. '9 Clearly, such a
move would have been in conflict with France's goal of
establishing French primacy in Western -urope.
Consequently, France rejected the proposal,
Having failed to develop a common economic policy
with Germany as stipulated by the Treaty of Cooperation,
France undertook to protect national businesses from
the challenge of American capital investments in 1966,
The French prevented Phillips Petroleum from establishing
lu J. J. Servan-Schreiber, iDl2^'^^l£££L±h2J«lD£.ZSl>
(Few Form: Antheneum blouse inc., 19687, pp. 107-108.
1 9 John ^iebold, "multinational Corporations: -dry




a headquarters in bordeaus, F. F, Goodrich from buying
into ^-leber-Golombes , and General Motors fro:., building
a 100 million dollar plant in France, Those companies
simply vent to Belgium and -est Germany where American
capital investment remained welcome, France could not
persuade other European nations to reject or limit
mmerican investments raid haa to abandon the position.'"
France lacked the military strength and political
credibility to assume leadership in ^urope independent
of the U, J„ French nationalism was threatening to Germany
because it could have alienated the b.C.
?
leaving Germans
without either a psychological foundation or membership
in a more united Europe,. European nations such as Italy,
Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands have preferred
to be deeendent uuon the U.S. for scientific milit^rv
and econoi.de leadership rather than be dependent upon
an expansionist Frcr.ce or a revisionist Germany,
IK7LbldKCIKG COMMON DECISIONS
The second factor stated by Kissinger that has
developed NATO's nuclear dilemma was each major ally's
desire to have substantial influence on common decisions.
This issue has been indirectly discussed. As Europeans
perceived America's nuclear commitment diminishing, they
pressed for a consensus regarding the use of tactical
20 Gilpin, p. ifl6, pp. L65- L:36.
21 Gilpin, p. >i1 6, pp. ^35-^36
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nuclear weapons. This loci to the agreement on the three
stop response in 1967 and to agreement in 1969 that
nuclear weapons would be initially used against targets
of military importance., -'ranee did not participate in
these decisions because she had withdrawn fro.:, the inte-
grated I- /iO command structure in 1966.
According to official French strategic thought
during the mid-1960s, future wars would be fought with
nuclear weapons.' So long as nuclear weapons remain in
the hands of national governments, decisions about their
use would be made by leaders of nation-states. Starting
with the conviction that national sovereignty was ,
indivisible, the French argued that control of nuclear
forces, as the most sensitive nerve of that sovereignty,
2?
was equally indivisible.
it appears that France's views on national sovereignty
and indivisibility of nuclear control have remained unaltered,
judging by this statement made by French defense Finis ter
Fichel Febre in 1971*
"Nuclear risk is not divisible. . ..that
risk is so enormous that people would accept
it only as a final defense of their supreme
self-interest. ,! <-3
NATO , under American leadership, following American
strategic doctrine, did not give France a satisfactory
Joshua, p. lf0*
23 Michel Febre, 'France's Global Strategy",
Foxelgn,, Aff a;trs_, April 1971, p. 397.
71

voice in the integrated coramand structure, and France
would not assume a leadership role within KATO... Still,
other nations were not willing to substitute French
leadership for *»nerican leadership outside of KAT'Q, c- r
Paradoxically, French withdrawal from the integrated
KATO structure has been viewed by the French as giving
them greater influence over U.S. strategic doctrine than
they could have exerted within the structure,. The loss
of French soldiers, reluctance on the part of other
European nations to raise force levels, and U.S. "domestic
pressures to decrease force levels in Furope, in the French
view,, increase the likelihood that the United States will
be pushed toward a strategic doctrine which places
greater emphasis on nuclear weapons •
^
I'H-j h^i-iu FOR CHl'ilAiiLjLZ-jD CONTROL
The problem of retaining substantial influence
over common decisions is closely related to Kissinger's
third factor — the need for centralised control of
military operations. From 1961, when the United States
reoriented American military forces to allow a greater
conventional capacity, until 1963, the Kennedy Admin-
istration stressed that Europe's contribution to KATO be
limited to a conventional role.. The risks and uncertainties
2 1 '- Pfaltzgraff, pp. U1-55
25 Pfaltzgraff, pp. Vl-^2.
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raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons into an
area of conflict required tight control, although such
control became inconsistent to some decree with a coal-
ition of sovereign states.. The McNanara cost-effectiveness
analysis approach to the issue of nuclear control was
apparent in U.S. statements regarding this problem
during the early 1960s.. Li«S» official spokesmen consist-
ently emphasized that any European contribution to the
over-all nuclear' strength of the Alliance was negligible,
and Europeans would more efficiently use their resources
if they would increase their conventional contribution
and let the U.o. handle the nuclear commitment. ^° European
nuclear forces were described as "provocative" and "weak".:
The HcHamara pentagon considered that the U.o. strategic
deterrent had to have the capability to destroy 50 percent
of the Soviet industrial capacity and 20 percent of the
Soviet population to be credible. In these terms, no
European effort could have been credible, for neither
France nor -Britain intended to build a strategic force
large enough to accomplish such a task, Since European
nuclear forces were not. credible, according to the
McKamara analysis, they were prone to preemptive
destruction,
henry A, Kissinger, "Coalition Deplornacy in a
Nuclear Age", American h'efonr.e ^olicy. 2nd edition.- ed,
hark £, Smith and ^laude J. Johns, Jr., (Baltimore, Ad.s
John Hopkins i?ress, 1963), pp. 1 82-183*
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I.he credibility problem of independent European
nuclear forces was closely related to President Kennedy's
Grand Design for Europe, his Administration pursued the
Coal of helping the development of a united Europe,
including Britain, into a free-trading community. The
United States would then form a partnership with such a
federated Europe on the basis of true equality of status*
& coordinated military-strategic .program was to have been
part of the design, but the military interdependence
proposed by the U..S« Defense Department meant a continuing
reliance on the American nuclear deterrent, European
efforts to provide a nuclear deterrent were counter-
productive to the Kennedy Administration's policy towards
the Atlantic Community, -he interdependence Kennedy
sought meant that ^urouean states would have had to
surrender their national sovereignty, a development
that i;as not likely, American attempts to encourage
greater European participation in the doctrine of "flexible
response" came to be seen as a further assertion of U.S.
27hegemony concealing dubious political notives.
MLF
in 1963, following the NASSAU Agreement and DeGauiio';
rejection of the Grand Design, America could no longer
stress that Europe's contribution to a common defense
effort be United to a conventional role and sought a




device for charing the odium of nuclear responsibility.
fhe multi-lateral nuclear force (MM7 ) became that
device. -he *-LF v/as soon as the means to foster inter-
dependence while providing centralized command and
control. u Originally the M-d-' was to have boon a force
of -'"olaris submarines jointly financed and operated by
i'mmw governments , each of which v/as to have a veto on
the firing of their missiles. Later', beeaiise the l! ;. i::od
manning" was to ,be applied to individual vessels and
would have created special hazards for submarine
operations, the scheme was modified to allow for a force
of twenty five surface ships armed with Solaris missiles.'-''
From a military standpoint, I-iLF was technically
complicated and of questionable military value. -dm L'.o.
decision to substitute a force of surface ships for the
submarines was viewed by many Europeans, especially the
roii—'.*-, as a move to an inferior lores aesignea to
pacify European desires to influence decisions on the
use of nuclear weapons while the u.o. retained a superior
submarine force for a national deterrent, ^y sponsoring
two deterrent forces, the U.S. fell victim to its own
critism of independent nuclear forces -~ the K:AIO
surface force would add little to the overall deterrent
and represented an inefficient allocation of resources
£







to iJAT0 1 s defense posture.-^
Germany supported the proposal, because it offered
tne ' J c st German government a voice in the control of
nuclear weapons, i-ritain was opposed to it because the
I.LI? concept meant the --ritish would lose their inaopondoii
national deterrent. -he -ritish countered with a pro'.;.;-:
for the creation of an Atlantic huciear i'orce i-.l'.F)
which would have provided a NATO nuclear force Co: -posed
of national contingents, thus preserving the British
national force. Germany opposed this plan because it
provided for only modest German participation, and
Germany wanted a greater voice in •-'estern strategy.
France viewed I'-ILF as an abduction of national sovereignity
horway and Denmark opposed ia^F and AL'F because they
considered the forces to be a proliferation of nuclear
capabilities,- '
Robert Pfaltzgraff has analyzed the opposition of
smaller I-IAIO countries such as Norway and Denmark to the
building of a European nuclear force or to the develop-
ment of national atonic capabilities in -Western Europe.-
Le believes smaller countries are generally convinced thai
in an age of nuclear weapons and technologically advanced
delivery systems they cannot provide for their own
defense. Only the United States can provide a credible
30 Pfaltzgraff, p. 50- ?1
.
31 Pfaltsgraff, p. 1*6-52.
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deterrent and defense. The substitution of an European
nuclear deterrent by Britain or France or of a -uropean
combined force would not have the credibility of the U.S.
nuclear guarantee. In addition, smaller KATO countries
night have no greater influence than they have at
present. Hence, they have little incentive to see": major
changes in the existing KaIG structure,
Late in 196'+, ^resident Johnson reviewed the ML?
proposal and ordered that U.S. pressures for its adoption
be relaxed. ML? had been a "hardware* 1 solution to the
strategic dissensus within KATO, and had failed to
provide central command and control consistent with the
needs of independent nation-states. Subsequently, the
U.S. pressed for a non-hardware solution to the problem
of nuclear control that would be compatible with the U.S.
objectives of non-proliferation, Sast-w'est arms control,
and preserving the KATO alliance. In December 1966, two
permanent groups for nuclear planning were established.
The first, the Nuclear defense Affairs Committee, -is open
to membership to all KATO nations for general planning.
Subordinate to the committee is the huclear Planning
Group. 33 ijiese bodies provide the framework for continuing
examination of strategic issues and the development of
common policies on arms control and disarmanent including
32 Pfaltzgraff, p. 50.
33 rTaltzgraff, pp. 51-b*2.
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issues related to nuclear proliferation. These bodies
are not able to resolve specific military problems
especially so Ions a s France remains outside the
integrated command system, but so long as the perceived
threat of an actual Soviet invasion remains low, deter-
mination of specific military issues nay possibly be
postponed, effective consultation has provided trie
first step towards resolving NATO's strategic dissensus.
Although NATO nations maintain differing desires
regarding the Alliance, frank discussion of these
differences may help develop a consensus workable so
Ions as an effective nuclear deterrent can be maintained.
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SOLVING THE DISSSNSUS - A NEW NATO STRATEGY.
The restoration of Atlantic strategic consensus
depends upon the willingness of both the United States
and West European countries to modify their prevailing
strategic doctrines. For the United States, the need
for changes is especially great, since conventional
force levels in Europe are not likely to remain
adequate to support the doctrine of "flexible response"...
detente and the diminishing threat of general war in
Europe coupled with the possibility of successful SALT
and K3FR negotiations are likely to push NATO toward a
strategy which gives greater emphasis to nuclear
weapons than the present official doctrine. Even in the
unlikely event that the threat of war were to increase
in Europe, it is doubtful that "flexible response" could
be made workable. France could probably not be counted
upon to rejoin NATO commands in support of the present
doctrine.
The proper balance between nuclear deterrent forces
and conventional or general purpose forces is difficult
to determine. Today, pressures are great for increased
reliance on nuclear weapons. The United States is
considering a greater counterforce capability for the
U.S. national strategic system. It is argued that
such a development would provide a U.S. limited
response in the event of limited Soviet aggression.
It could also be argued, that such a development would
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eliminate the contradiction that exists between U.S.
national strategic doctrine and NATO strategic posture.
In light of military and political issues examined in
this paper, it can be shown that such a proposal cannot
provide a nuclear guarantee for the United States or NATO
without retaining and Modernizing adequate conventional
forces as sell.
'The threat of nuclear weapons has not deterred
United forris of ^oviet aggression during the last
decade. If one believes that future soviet aggression
is likely to be more of an open direct confrontation with
the u.o.j increasing a counterforce option could augment
the u.3. strategic deterrent. Soviet weapons development
indicates that they are pursuing the capability to directly
challenge «merican military forces at various points of
the globe. A strategic counterforce doctrine would be
effective to counter developing Soviet military power only
if the Soviets believed the U.S. would initiate a strategic
strike against their forces. To initiate such a strike,
both the U.o. and the Soviet Union would have to be
convinced that general nuclear war could be prevented.
After the introduction of nuclear weapons, I am not
convinced that escalation could be avoided..- >
The development of a counterforce capability could
present the U.o. with a first-strike potential which
would inspire intensified strategic arms development hy
the Soviets, -'or the superpowers, the benefits derived
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from a new strategic arms race are likely to be small in
relation to the costs of such programs. The effect on
independent European nuclear force:: could be e::trenely
destabilizing as Britain and France found their strategic
forces becoming rapidly obsolete in another superpower
arms race. In this situation, Britain and France would
become increasingly dependent upon a u.o. guarantee of
deterrence, a guarantee that would not be convincing
either In light of Soviet strategic arms developments or
past American diplomatic performances. rIhe U.o. has never
invoked nuclear weapons although American nuclear forces
have been placed on alert, how, as America attempts to
retract from over involvement in world affairs in the
post-Vietnam atmosphere, the likelihood that the U.S.
•r.Tr\~ 1 ~l r-3 t r-.TrA :."o vmir>1 ^on tTQ'vr»n".nc i **: ov^r r* -i *r> r»i it o + rj v- /•» & r\ + \-\ n t*
than a direct attack upon the U.S. seems to be diminished.
One possible solution would be for -'ranee and
Britain to combine, nuclear technological efforts, uowever,
such a development would be hard to reconcile with French
beliefs about the indivisibility of nuclear power and
national sovereignty* For the British, cooperation with
the French could mean the loss of the special relatione hip
with America in the area of nuclear research and development.
Aobert Gilpin, in France in the Age of the Scientific
State, has pointed out that nations are reluctant to
collaborate in areas of military importance for fear their
industries related to military potential may atrophy.'
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French and British cooperation on nuclear weapons urograms
presents special problems, Great Britain has developed a
nuclear weapons program throng}: cooperation with the U.S..
Such cooperation has not been extended to France, From
the British vie-;, Anglo-French cooperation could breech
teclinical secrets from the U.S. and rupture the partner-
ship with the U.S»> Britain would have to gain permission
from the U.S. before it could release much information
under the terms of the U.S. Atonic Energy --ct and the
1958 U.S.-British Agreement for Buclear Cooperation.
From the French point of view, British nuclear en ;ertise
would be second-hand U.S. derived technology and still
fail to place Branca on a par with Britian vis-a-vis
the U.S.. -technically France would be better off
obtaining support directly from the U.S.. In either
event, the U.S. congress Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy would have to give its support to such negotiations. -^
U.S. Congressional support would surely not be over-
whelming in light of continuing French actions to assert
foreign policies counter to U«S. interests • Witness the
recently held meeting of oil consuming nations in
Washington.
another obstacle to an Anglo-French nuclear arrange-
ment would be the problem of Best Germany's relationship
1 Gilpin, :r?* h27-h>-2Q.
2 martin, p. ho.
3 Joshua, pp. ^2- l+3«
02

eto such a combine. Germany , Britain, and France agreed
in 195*+ not to manufacture nuclear weapons on German
soil, and Germany and Great Britain have both signed th
Kon-Froliferation treaty. Yet Germany has the strongest
industrial and economic component in Europe and could
provide advanced electronic technology that could be
-used to improve guidance sys terns. ^
If an Anglo-French nuclear program were to develop
,
West Germany would find it hard to accept a position of
inferiority in Western Europe and might fear such a nuclea:
entente would hasten American troop 'Withdrawals fro:.!
Europe. ? Gn the other hand, technological cooperation or
oven allowing components of such a force to be stationed
on German soil would be hard to reconcile with Germany's
'•'Gstpolitiho'. A'en more important, a purely European
deterrent could not substitute for American strategic
forces. For Germany and smaller European nations who
have historically opposed the proliferation of nuclear
weapons into Europe, a -European deterrent coupled with
American withdrawal or a further deterioration of American-
European relations, lessening the credibility of any
American guarantee would increase Western Europe's
vulnerability to ooviet military aggression or political
meddling.
' i'-artin, p. k-6,
-> Joshua, p. hj,
o3

To me, it is clear that a now "hardware" approach
to the problem of strategic deterrence would be no more
effective than the previous i-L? effort, Instead, America's
commitment to -uropo must be reiterated in terms of renewed
efforts to solve the military, political, and economic
issues that now separate the IhffU countries. In the area
of strategic deterrence, renewing the superpower arms
race would not be such an effort. If --merice must
intensify efforts to develop a greater counterforce opticn
to match such a soviet development, let it be a limited
effort, not a major reorientation of U.S. strategic
posture. Since the likelihood of British-French nuclear
cooperation is small, the U.S. should not propose or
pursue such a development. However, America could
recognise the contribution of independent nuclear forces
by encouraging coordination of targets and consolidation
of balistic missile submarine patrols in the huclear
Planning Group.. Such an effort would provide retention
of national command and control of deterrent forces -./.die
providing nations who lack nuclear weapons a voice in
formulating NATO nuclear policy.
The proper balance between tactical nuclear weapons
end conventional forces on the European continent remains
elusive. Certain aspects of this issue see:, to have been
clearly defined however. Tactical nuclear w ago:.::, ilono,
are neither a credible defense nor a ere.' ;-terrcnt.
Conventional forces dj underpin diplomatic action and

provide an alternative to suicide or surrender. American
forces in Europe provide a political deterrent that
underscores -America's commitment to European defense.
Tactical nuclear weapons cannot provide a credible
offense, To excessively rely upon such weapons lessens
Ih'a'O's capability to drive into ^astern -urope in the
event of Soviet aggression against Western Europe,
-uch
a recognition of the present status-quo could encourage
the Soviets to pursue a more aggressive global foreign
policy. 1'he U«o. or a more closely united >'/estern -urepe
could not support tl-eman hopes for reunification without
maintaining military offensive capability in -urope.
Providing the ^evicts a guarantee that under no circum-
stances would they lose territory in a military confron-
tation with the h'est would free them of a great deal of
risk when calculating military moves or political
strategies in areas where any final outcome cannot be
clearly forecast
,
It may be that the tiireat of general war is "
diminishing, but the possibility of direct superpower
confrontation is increasing as the Soviets continue to
build-up their military forces, for America or lUiTO
to deny themselves the conventional strength necessary
to underpin diplomatic actions in the years ahead would
be tantamount to either surrender or living on the brink
of nuclear disaster,
'these issues must be tackled in NATO planning
->>

although, at present, it appears that chances for their
resolution are small. Detente may be a blessing in
disguise if NATO grasps the opportunity to reconcile
the military dissensus. Ihe opportunity is present to
develop .a ITATC doctrine somewhere between the extremes
of 3 unilateral American guarantee or a continuation
of the present fragmented dissensus.
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